I examine the economic costs and benefits of granting a right of first refusal to one of two bidders in a procurement auction. This right permits the favored bidder to win a contract by matching the bid of the competing bidder. Such a right, is often observed in business interactions, especially procurement.
Introduction
The mention of "favoritism" generally evokes negative images of corruption and cronyism. As common thinking goes, only the favored party gains while everybody else loses. I show in this paper that this is not always the case: By identifying conditions when the favored party wins but the favoring party wins too.
While favoritism takes on multiple forms, such as outright preference, subsidies, credits or special quotas, I focus on a mechanism known as the "right of first refusal" (ROFR). The "right of first refusal" allows the favored bidder to win the contract by matching the best bid of the competing bidders. The ROFR is interesting because it is a mechanism that is simple, both to implement and to observe, and hence is widely used as a form of favoritism. From the point of the view of the bidders the ROFR is a transparent policy (no subjective adjustment of bids) and easy to take into consideration when bidding. From the point of the view of the auctioneer the ROFR is an attractive mechanism because, its application requires a minimum of information about the bidders' characteristics and involves the setting of a single binary parameter: whom to favor.
The ROFR often is found as contingency clauses in leasing agreements, entertainment contracts and business partnerships. The ROFR in those cases gives a tenant, media network or business partner the right to purchase a property or stake before it can be offered to anyone else.
While in the above mentioned cases the ROFR is an explicitly stated right, quite often it is extended implicitly as well. For instance, in 2003 Pratt & Whitney, a leading manufacturer of jet turbines for airplanes, cried foul when it lost out in a bid to supply Airbus Industries with engines for the production of the Airbus military transportation plane A400M.
1 The company that ultimately was awarded the contract was EuroProp International, a European consortium of engine makers. For much of the bidding process Pratt & Whitney was confident to win the contract, as all sources indicated that its bid was by far the most competitive. However, last minute interventions by European government's led to Airbus' concession that EuroProp was allowed to revise its bid. This revised bid reportedly matched Pratt & Whitney's offer and ultimately won the contract.
One may interpret the fact that Airbus allowed EuroProp to resubmit its bid while no such option was given to Pratt & Whitney as implicitly granting a ROFR to a favored (domestic) bidder. Given the politically sensitive nature of contract, it is fair to assume that from the outset both bidders were aware of the possibility that the European government would intervene on behalf of "their" firms. Similarly, when the bankrupt South Korean brewery Jinro was put up for sale in 1999, the bidding process was also marred by last minute interventions.
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Oriental Brewery, a domestic bidder apparently favored by the seller, learned the terms of the bid made by Coors and submitted a second bid, which was accepted even though the original deadline for bids had already expired. Or, consider Carnival Corporation, a shipping cruise firm, soliciting bids for the contract to build the Queen Mary II ocean liner in 2000.
3 Having chosen two finalists, it allowed one of them, Harland & Wolff, a troubled but traditionrich British shipyard, to revise its bid. Harland & Wolff in fact had built the predecessor ship Queen Mary some 70 years ago and Carnival had stated publicly that for sentimental reasons it was predisposed to choose Harland & Wolff as long as they offered a competitive bid. Harland & Wolff failed to meet the bid put forward by its rival, Chantiers de L'Atlantique, and ultimately failed to win the contract. This led to suggestions that Carnival may have used the yard's bid merely to put pressure on Chantiers de L'Atlantique.
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In all these cases some of the ostensible motivation for granting a ROFR is political: To satisfy some notion of fairness (if say a long-term tenant or a small disadvantaged business is involved) or to simply reward long-term business partners or political allies. However, as the example of Harland & Wolff hypothesizes, granting a ROFR may also have economic motivations. This may be particularly true, if the competing bidders are unequal in their bidding strengths and the ROFR is given to the weaker bidder. In the Airbus example, the favored EuroProp consortium lagged Pratt & Whitney substantially in market share, while in the Queen Mary II case the competition between Harland & Wolff and Chantiers de L'Atlantique pitted a financially near-bankrupt shipyard with no recent experience in building ocean liners against a proven maker of cruise ships.
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The literature on optimal auctions, such as Myerson (1981) , supports the idea that the ROFR can serve as a tool to extract higher payoffs by levelling the playing field between competitors. It states that the auctioneer does best when subsidizing bidders who are more likely to draw unfavorable private values. The intuition here is that by levelling the playing field, the auctioneer is able to elicit more aggressive bids from the otherwise stronger bidder. While the ROFR proves to be a rather crude instrument, that lacks the ability to fine-tune the degree of subsidization, it is nevertheless capable to imperfectly implement the idea of handicapping the stronger bidder. The simplicity of the mechanism, both in terms of information requirements and implementation, make it an attractive candidate for handicapping.
I try to capture this intuition by formulating a model with a single buyer and two asymmetric sellers, who compete against each other in an independent private values auction. The buyer has the option of granting a ROFR to one of the sellers beforehand. My model confirms the levelling of the playing field notion on two levels. When the buyer is required to grant a ROFR, he will always prefer to favor the weak bidder. In fact, I show that for lower levels of asymmetry between the bidders granting a ROFR to the weak bidder induces the strong bidder to behave as if he was facing an equally strong bidder. When the buyer has complete discretion over whether or not to offer a ROFR, he will only do so if the asymmetry is sufficiently large.
The ROFR proves to be too powerful a tool when the two bidders do not differ much in the cost distribution. In such a situation the ROFR overshoots in tilting the competition in favor of the weak right-holder who extracts rents that would otherwise have gone to the auctioneer. While the strong (nonfavored) bidder, as mentioned before, acts as if facing a symmetric opponent and therefore bids more aggressively than otherwise, the favored weak bidder will take advantage of his right and pursue a "wait and see" strategy. He will initially only place a token bid and later decide whether or not to match his opponent's bid.
As the degree of asymmetry increases, the gains that the buyer makes from neutralizing the strong bidder's original advantage becomes larger and larger. At the same time, the weak bidder will become less capable of actually exercising his right, because increasingly he would lose money if he matched his strong opponent's bid. Eventually, granting a ROFR does manage to provide a balanced adjustment of the bidding strengths of the two bidders.
This rationale mostly carries over to the case in which the auctioneer additionally has the freedom to set the reserve price. The ROFR still proves to be too heavy of an instrument when differences between the bidders are small. However, in this setting the reserve price can serve as a tool to not only to increase expected surplus but also to counterbalance the effect of a ROFR. In fact, I show that the reserve price and ROFR exhibit somewhat complementary characteristics with regard to influencing expected surplus. For high degrees of asymmetry, the reserve price completely displaces the ROFR as the tool of choice for the auctioneer as the ROFR by itself proves to be too weak to offset the asymmetry. For low degrees of asymmetry, as mentioned, the ROFR proves to be actually harmful, so the auctioneer prefers to rely on setting the reserve price only. Only for intermediate degrees of asymmetry can the auctioneer combine the two policy tools in a non-conflicting way.
Much of the interaction between the reserve price and the ROFR can be understood by the impact of the reserve on the effective degree of asymmetry that the two bidders face. I show that endogenously setting the reserve price exacerbates the extent of the asymmetry which for low to intermediate degrees of asymmetry offsets the effect of a ROFR. This paper is related to the literature on preference in asymmetric auctions and on the right of first refusal. The effects of granting a ROFR have been studied by Bikhchandani, Lippman & Ryan (2003) , Choi (2003) , Manelli (2003) and Arozamena & Weinschelbaum (2004) . Bikhchandani, Lippman & Ryan (2003) and Choi (2003) both look at symmetric auctions with a ROFR granted to a bidder. They both come to the conclusion that granting a ROFR is costly for the seller. They differ from this paper in that they look at settings with symmetric bidders and additionally allow for correlation in the bidders' private values. Manelli (2003) discusses a ROFR-like feature in his paper on procurement design. His focus however is in determining conditions for optimality rather than profit maximization or cost minimization as in this paper. Arozamena & Weinschelbaum (2004) also look at a symmetric auction setting, but additional allow the ROFR to be granted with a probability of less than 1. Their work however focuses on the effect of favoritism on the bidding behavior rather than the auctioneer's expected benefit, as it leaves open whether the auctioneer is compensated in return for the preferential treatment granted. Rothkopf, Harstad & Fu (2003) as well as Koc & Neilson (2004) and Burguet & Perry (2003) have explored issues regarding preferential treatment in asymmetric settings. Rothkopf, Harstad & Fu (2003) analyze asymmetric auctions in which preferential treatment comes in the form of adjusted bids. They find that for a wide range of parameters that offering some degree of preferential treatment generally is beneficial to the auctioneer. Koc & Neilson (2004) look at an asymmetric auction setting, where the auctioneer offers each bidder preferential treatment in return for a bribe. Unlike in my model the preferential treatment is non-exclusive, that is available to any bidder willing to pay the bribe, and only takes effect when the paying bidder actually places the most competitive bid. Such a bidder only needs to pay the second highest bid. Burguet & Perry (2003) shares the most similarities with this paper in that they consider a private value asymmetric procurement auction where the auctioneer can decide to grant a ROFR. They make different assumptions about the cost distribution, which leads them to conclude that granting a ROFR for free never benefits the auctioneer. However, they show that the auctioneer may gain if he auctions off the ROFR to the highest paying bidder beforehand. Because of the similarity of their model and difference in conclusions between my findings and their conclusions I provide some more detailed intuition in section 3 I show how the conclusion is senstive to the different assumptions made about the cost distributions and that the common conclusion that favoritism cannot benefit the auctioneer does not universally hold.
The idea that the auctioneer may want to sell the ROFR to a bidder also can be found in Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky & Verdier (2000) who look at the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 I describe the details of the model with asymmetric bidders and private values. Then, in section 3 I first derive the equilibrium bidding functions for the model with no reserve price. Using the equilibrium bidding functions I obtain closed form expressions for the expected cost when the buyer does or does not grant a ROFR. By comparing the expected costs under either regime, I characterize conditions that make it beneficial for the buyer to grant a ROFR. In section 4 I allow the buyer to set the reserve price. Given an endogenous reserve price, I derive equilibrium bidding functions both when the auctioneer offers a ROFR and when he declines to do so. Again, I find closed form expression for the expected costs to the buyer and compare them. Based on this comparison I describe the conditions under which a ROFR benefits the buyer. Finally, section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes.
Model
Suppose there are 1 buyer and 2 asymmetric sellers, weak (w) and strong (s). The buyer has a demand for a single unit of a good. The sellers are capable of providing the good at a cost θ i , where i = w, s. The cost type θ i is privately known information to each respective seller. That is, I am looking at an asymmetric independent private value auction. However, it is common knowledge that the cost types θ i are distributed independently and uniformly on the supports of [θ w , 1] and [θ s , 1] respectively, with F i and f i being the distribution and density functions for each bidder. Notice the support for the weak bidder is a subset of the support of the strong bidder. To simplify the model θ s is normalized to 0. It is assumed that θ w ∈ (0, 1) , or that the weak seller's cost distribution is first-order stochastically dominating and hence is the less efficient producer. In fact, it may be convenient to interpret θ w as a parameter of the degree of asymmetry between the two bidders. Additionally, both buyers know the maximum willingness-to-pay of the buyer, which is 1 when there is no reserve price and r with a reserve price r.
The buyer can choose to grant a right-of-first-refusal to one of the two sellers, which will become common knowledge. The sequence of decisions is as follows: First, the buyer makes a public announcement whether to grant one of the bidders a ROFR and if so, identifies the favored bidder. Then the two bidders submit bids in a first-price sealed bid auction (FPA). If no ROFR was granted, the winner of the auction is awarded the contract and pays his bid. If a ROFR was granted and the favorite (that is, the right-holder) has the lowest bid, the favorite is awarded the contract and receives his own bid as payment. If the nonfavorite wins in this auction, the favorite is offered the opportunity to match the bid of the non-favorite and to be awarded the contract. If the favorite declines to match, the non-favorite is awarded the contract and receives his own bid as payment.
No reserve price
In order to simplify the initial analysis in this section, I assume that the buyer sets no reserve price. In section 4, this assumption will be relaxed and the buyer will be able to set and announce a reserve price r optimally.
I derive conditions under which granting a ROFR benefits the auctioneer. I do so by comparing the expected cost to the auctioneer when assigning a ROFR to one of the bidders and when not offering one at all.
I begin by deriving the benchmark case when the auctioneer does not favor either bidder. I obtain the bidders' equilibrium bidding functions, generate the expression for the expected surplus and show that the larger the asymmetry, the smaller the expected surplus. I then proceed to derive the corresponding equilibrium expressions when assigning a ROFR to either bidder. I show that the auctioneer will always prefer to favor the weak bidder, if he is forced to assign a ROFR. However, when assigning a ROFR is optional, he will only do so when asymmetry is sufficiently large.
No ROFR granted to either bidder
Following Krishna (2002) I find for the equilibrium bidding functions for both bidders that:
Proposition 1 If the auctioneer does not favor either bidder, then the inverse equilibrium bidding functions of the two bidders are
Notice that the constants k w and k s equal 0 when the bidders are completely symmetric, θ w = 0. In that case the equilibrium bidding functions are identical:
2 . As θ w increases, k w increases and k s falls. Compared to the symmetric case, a weak bidder therefore bids more agressively (each cost type places a lower bids if asymmetry increases) while a strong bidder bids less aggressively (also see Maskin/Riley for general characteristics).
From the inverse bidding functions, I obtain the expression for the expected payment, as stated below.
Corollary 2 The expected payment in a first-price auction without favoritism is given by
Numerical analysis of the expected cost expressions reveals that it increases strictly monotonely in θ w , the degree of asymmetry. The intuition is as follows: Any increase in asymmetry induces the weak bidder to bid more aggressively and lower his mark-up. A strong bidder knowing that his opponent is becoming weaker (because θ w has increased) bids less aggressively and increases his markup. As asymmetry increases, the scope of reducing the mark-up becomes smaller and smaller for the weak bidder. These gains to the auctioneer get outweighed by the increasingly less aggressive bids of the strong bidder.
Mandatory assignment of a ROFR
Suppose now the auctioneer is forced to assign a ROFR to one of the two bidders. I first derive the equilibrium bidding functions for both the favored and the nonfavored bidder and show why the auctioneer would assign the ROFR to the weak bidder, if he was required to grant such a right.
The equilibrium bidding functions are given by, Lemma 3 In a first-price auction with ROFR the favored bidder i will always bid 1, while the non-favorite −i's equilibrium bidding function will be b −i (θ) = max( θ+1 2 , θ i ), where θ i is the lower end of the support of the favored bidder's cost distribution.
Proof. First I show why the favored bidder has a weakly dominant strategy of bidding 1.: If a favorite had bid b < 1 and had won, then he could have done better by bidding more than b.If the non-favorite's bid b −i has been equal or less than b an increase in b doesn't change any payoff, because the favorite will always receive the offer to win by matching b −i . If b −i > b, then there is scope for increasing the winning bid b and thereby obtaining a higher payoff.
The non-favored bidder's objective is to maximize:
He maximizes the gross profit, given by the difference between his bid b −i and his cost θ, multiplied by the probability that he actually wins the contract, which is equal to the probability
that the favorite declines to match the bid. The solution to the first-order condition of this problem b * −i provides the optimal bid as long as b * −i < θ i , where θ i is the favorite's lowest possible cost type. For sufficiently large values of θ the solution of the first-order condition is optimal and the non-favored bidder will mark-up his bid and bid θ+1 2 . Note that the amount of shading is independent of the characteristics of his opponent's cost distribution.
If b * −i < θ i the non-favored bidder can improve his profits by raising his bid. Hence he will choose a bid that just barely underbids his opponent and take full advantage of the difference in cost. This is, because he is certain that the favored bidder will decline to match his bid. This can only occur if θ is sufficiently low, such that θ+1 2 < θ i . Specifically this is the case, if the weak bidder is favored and the asymmetry between the two bidders is large enough such that θ w > 0.5.
Since the price that the buyer will pay is always the non-favored bidder's bid (either to the favored bidder if he matched the bid or the non-favored bidder if the favorite declined to match the bid), the expected cost to the buyer is solely determined by the non-favorite bidding function.
I now show that declining to favor the strong bidder is preferable for the auctioneer, because the auctioneer can expect lower bids from a strong nonfavored bidder rather than a weak one.
The nature of the non-favorite's bidding function makes it necessary to compare the expected costs for two different cases: If the weak bidder is relatively similar in cost, that is θ w ≤ 0.5, then the non-favored bidder will always bid according to his own cost type and the expected cost to the buyer when favoring bidder i is given by
The expected cost to the auctioneer is completely independent of the degree of asymmetry if the buyer favors the weak bidder. This is a result of a (strong) non-favorite's bidding function that is independent of the characteristics of his opponent's cost distribution and the fact that a (strong) non-favorite's cost distribution is unaffected by the change in asymmetry. On the other hand, if the buyer favors the strong bidder then the degree of asymmetry will affect expected cost. The distribution of the non-favored (weak) bidder's bids is affected by any change in asymmetry and hence the expected cost reflects any changes in asymmetry as well.
Comparing expected costs, I find E(Cost, w) − E(Cost, s) > 0 if and only if 1 4 θ w > 0, which is true since θ w > 0. Hence it is always more costly to favor the strong bidder and hence the auctioneer chooses to favor weak bidder.
If the weak bidder is substantially weaker than his strong opponent, θ w > 1 2 , then a strong non-favorite is able to take full advantage of his lower cost type as mentioned above. Hence, the expected cost to the auctioneer if the weak bidder is favored, changes to
Notice, that bidders with cost types θ < 2θ w − 1 bid θ w . As asymmetry increases, a larger portion of strong bidder can mark-up their bid to θ w . Given that this minimum bid itself rises with greater asymmetry, expected cost increases quadratically.
The expected cost to the auctioneer if the strong bidder is favored remains unchanged, since a weak bidder always bids according to
Hence if I compare the expected costs from favoring either one bidder, I find that for θ w > 
Summarizing the results of the preceding paragraphs, I have hence shown that
Proposition 4 In an auction with (mandatory) ROFR the buyer will always prefer to favor the weak bidder w.
The intuition for this result closely follows the previously mentioned implication of the literature on optimal auctions, such as Myerson (1981) . The auctioneer stands to gain from favoring the weaker bidder, because he is able to level the playing field. Eliciting more aggressive bids from the strong bidder by favoring his weak opponent yields more gains than vice versa, because the strong bidder has more scope for bidding more aggressively. In particular in our setting where the favoritism comes in the form of a ROFR, as seen the expected cost is entirely determined by the bid of the non-favored seller. Declining to favor the strong bidder, the bidder with potentially lower cost, hence yields more low bids and a lower overall expected cost to the auctioneer.
In fact, the non-favorite's bidding function closely resembles the equilibrium bidding function for a symmetric (θ w = 0) auction with no ROFR. As I have shown ealier, in such an auction the equilibrium bid is θ+1 2 . This is the same as a weak non-favorite or a strong non-favorite with low degrees of asymmetry. This implies that, at least for low degrees of asymmetry, granting an ROFR essentially achieves to induce the (strong) non-favored bidder to act as if he was facing an equal opponent. Hence, the buyer benefits when declining to favor the bidder who has the more favorable cost distribution.
For future reference, here is a closed form expression of the optimal expected cost for the auctioneer when granting a ROFR:
Corollary 5 The (lowest) expected payment by the auctioneer in a first-price auction with favoritism is given by
Comparing ROFR with no favoritism
While I have determined that giving a ROFR to the weak bidder is the optimal choice when forced to grant a ROFR, I demonstrate that not granting a ROFR still does better for the auctioneer when asymmetry is low. Assigning a ROFR in a sense changes the degree of asymmetry that the two bidders experience. Hence any favoritism leads to less agressive bidding by the favored side, which potentially more than outweighs the benefits from more competitive bids by the non-favored. Considering that the ROFR is a very simple mechanism of favoritism that cannot be fine-tuned, the ROFR excessively tilts the bidding competition in favor of the right-holder when the degree of asymmetry is low. In other words, assigning a ROFR to the weak bidder when asymmetry is low makes him an excessively strong bidder.
I now compare the expected costs of the two scenarios when the buyer grants or declines to grant a ROFR. Simple comparative statics show that expected costs are monotonely increasing in θ w , the degree of asymmetry. Hence by determining the value of θ * w for which the expected costs are the same I can characterize the ranges of θ w when offering a ROFR is in the interest of the buyer.
Given the particular form of the equation obtained under (2) it is not possible to obtain a closed form expression for θ * w , instead I provide a graph below and a table in the appendix that compare the expected costs under both regimes. Both show the numerically computed result for θ * w is 0.419. Looking at graph 1, one sees that for values of θ w < θ * w the auctioneer prefers not to grant a ROFR, while for higher degrees of asymmetry he does better when favoring the weak bidder. The benefits from granting a ROFR are highest for medium degrees of asymmetry and tend to diminish as bidders become lopsidedly asymmetric. Furthermore, the largest reduction that the buyer can achieve by employing favoritism is about 5%. On the other hand, the benefits from foregoing any favoritism are largest when the bidders are symmetric or almost symmetric. I summarize the finding as Proposition 6 When the auctioneer has the option to assign a ROFR, he will only do so for degrees of asymmetry θ w > 0.419. In that case, the auctioneer does best by favoring the weak bidder.
To get a better intuitive sense of the results, it is helpful to examine the effect of an increase in asymmetry on the expected cost with or without a RFOR. In both settings an increase in asymmetry leads to higher expected cost. However, while with a ROFR the increase in cost is delayed until asymmetry is sufficiently large without favoritism asymmetry immediately impacts expected cost. Therefore rising asymmetry affects expected cost more directly without a ROFR.
The expected cost under favoritism is unaffected by an increase in asymmetry (as long as θ w ≤ 1 2 ) because as found earlier the non-favored (strong) bidder will not be able to exploit his cost advantage -the ROFR granted to his opponent in fact induces him to bid as if he was facing an equally strong bidder. Only once asymmetry becomes sufficiently large (θ w > 1 2 ) will the non-favored (strong) bidder start to exploit the fact that in some cases he is the only possible bidder.
On the other hand, in the absence of favoritism, the increase in asymmetry immediately causes expected costs to rise. As mentioned earlier, any increase in asymmetry makes the weak bidder bid more aggressively. A strong bidder knowing that his opponent is becoming weaker (because θ w has increased) bids less aggressively. On net, any asymmetry causes more losses due to the strong bidder than gains due to the weak bidder. Furthermore, any increase in asymmetry exacerbates those net losses. Hence expected cost rises with asymmetry.
Granting a ROFR eliminates the losses due lack of aggressiveness to the strong bidder at the price of creating losses due to subsidizing the weak bidder. At low levels of asymmetry this is an unfavorable trade-off for the auctioneer, while at higher levels of asymmetry this is beneficial.
In summary, at least for lower degrees of asymmetry (θ w ≤ 1 2 ) one observes that while granting a ROFR involves a transfer of surplus to the right-holder, the extra cost imposed on the buyer by the ROFR is constant. That is, the buyer so to speak incurs a fixed loss by favoring one bidder. On the other hand, when declining to offer a ROFR the strong bidder can fully exploit his cost advantage over the weak bidder. The loss that results to the auctioneer is small if the degree of asymmetry is low, but increases as asymmetry rises and eventually surpasses the fixed loss of granting a ROFR.
At this point, it is useful to contrast the above results with the findings of Burguet and Perry (2003) . As mentioned in the introduction, they use the same framework but assume different cost distributions whose main distinction are that they are of identical supports regardless of the degree of asymmetry introduced. Given this type of cost distribution as asymmetry increases the expected surplus diminishes whether a ROFR is granted or not, just as in my setting. However, the expected surplus is always larger when the auctioneer declines to offer a ROFR. This may be explained by the difference in how providing a ROFR interacts with an increase in asymmetry.
In my setting an increase in asymmetry impacts the size of the support and affects the lower end of the support for the weak bidder. However it does not impact the shape of the distribution across the support. If the auctioneer grants a ROFR to one of the bidder, a change in asymmetry (at least for low to intermediate levels) does not change the bidding behavior of either bidder. The non-favored bidder in particular will see no reason to adjust his bidding behavior as the marginal trade-offs, which are influenced of the shape of the opponent's cost distribution, that he faces are not altered by the increase in asymmetry.
In contrast, in Burguet and Perry's setting an increase in asymmetry causes the cost type distribution to become more skewed towards the high end. That is, the shape and slope of the distribution distinctively changes with asymmetry. If the auctioneer grants a ROFR, the non-favored now faces different trade-offs. Hence his bidding function changes and in fact a (strong) non-favored bidder bids less aggressively.
Hence, while in my setting the ROFR can completely offset any increase in asymmetry, that is not possible in Burguet and Perry's setting. In their model offering a ROFR manages to dampen the loss in expected surplus as asymmetry increases, but this gain never manages to overcome the cost of granting preferential treatment to one of the bidders. This underscores the notion that the common sense intuition that favoritism always must hurt the auctioneer does not hold and in fact depends on the type of bidders that the auctioneer is facing.
Endogenous reserve price
So far I have assumed that there was no reserve price. Now, I assume that the auctioneer optimally chooses his reserve price.
Again, I start by presenting the benchmark case when the auctioneer does not favor either bidder and then derive the corresponding equilibrium expressions when assigning a ROFR to either bidder. The auctioneer will always prefer to favor the weak bidder, if he is forced to assign a ROFR. However, when assigning a ROFR is optional, he only will do so when asymmetry is sufficiently large. Furthermore, granting a ROFR strictly improves the auctioneer's expected surplus only for intermediate levels of asymmetry. I show how control over the reserve price does improve expected surplus but also reduces the effectiveness of the ROFR.
No ROFR granted to either bidder
I begin by computing the inverse equilibrium bidding functions for both bidders, while moving the rather long and technical details of the derivations to the appendix:
Proposition 7 In a FPA, where the auctioneer optimally sets the reserve price r and no ROFR is granted, the two bidders' i = s, w bidding behavior is described by the following inverse bidding functions θ i (b):
Additionally, the lowest bid placed by either bidder is b(r) = (r−2)r θ w −2 .
Proof. [See appendix]
The inverse bidding functions generates the expected surplus to the auctioneer if he sets an optimal reserve price r * such that both bidders participate, which in its general form is given by
Given the uniform distributions for the cost types of both bidders, F s and F w , the above expression simplifies to:
While I obtain a closed-form expression for E(Surplus, no), it is not possible to derive a closed form solution for r * from the related first-order condition. I therefore compute r * and E(Surplus, no) using numerically methods for various degrees of asymmetry θ w .
Additionally another case has to be considered: When the optimal reserve price is sufficiently low such that r * < θ w the weak bidder declines to bid at all. The remaining strong bidder then faces a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation. He then bids r * as long as his cost type θ s < r * and not bid otherwise. The expected surplus to the auctioneer then becomes: The following is observed about the expected surplus when no one is favored: The expected surplus decreases as the degree of asymmetry as measured by θ w increases. The expected surplus never falls below 1 4 since the auctioneer can always turn the auction into a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer. I show by numerical computation that this is in fact the preferred strategy if θ w ≥ 0.607 .
The decrease in expected surplus is explained by the same ideas as in the no reserve price situation. When the auctioneer does not grant a ROFR any increase in asymmetry immediately translates into more aggressive bids by the weak bidder and less aggressive bids by the strong bidder. Because the support of the cost distribution for the weak bidder becomes smaller with increased asymmetry, asymmetry removes the lowest cost types of the weak bidder from the bidding and raise the lowest bid placed. Even with less mark-up by the remaining cost types of the weak bidder this raises the expected cost to the auctioneer.
Mandatory assignment of a ROFR
Now, the auctioneer must assign a ROFR to one of the two bidders. I first derive the equilibrium bidding functions for both the favored and the non-favored bidder and determine that the auctioneer would assign the ROFR to the weak bidder. For the equilibrium bidding function when a ROFR is assigned, I find that Lemma 8 For a reserve price r < 1, the favored bidder i always bids r in a FPA with ROFR if his cost type θ i ≤ r and not bid otherwise. The non-favored bidder bids as long as his cost type θ −i ≤ r. The non-favored bidder −i has an equilibrium bidding function b −i (θ) = min(r, max( θ+1 2 , θ i )).
Proof. The bidding behavior of the favored bidder follows the same argument which I outlined in Proposition 1. The favored bidder still initially bids r and matches his opponent's bid if it is higher than his cost type and decline to match it otherwise, because any lower bid decreases his profits without improving his chances of winning. Since the favored bidder does not change his bidding behavior, the fundamental trade-offs that the non-favored bidder faces when making his bidding decision remain unchanged. Hence, his equilibrium bidding function does not change except for incorporating an additional constraint that truncates the upper portion of his bidding function.
The somewhat surprising result for the non-favored bidder is that his equilibrium bidding function does not change other than that his bids are now "capped" at r. Generally, one would expect that a binding reserve not only puts an upper bound on the bids submitted, but also changes the general structure of the bidding function such as the mark-up for any given cost type. Consider in comparison the equilibrium bidding function b(θ) of a (symmetric) first-price auction without ROFR with a reserve price r:
Here the mark-up on the cost depends on the reserve price and decreases as the reserve price r falls. With a lower reserve price a bidder is likelier to face more cost-efficient types and hence needs to bid more aggressively. This is because to win a bidder has to beat his opponent's bid. Since some opponent types will not bid he needs to consider his opponent's distribution of only the cost types that actually bid, which is affected by the reserve price.
However with a ROFR a non-favored bidder has to beat his opponent's cost type in order to win. Hence his optimal bid does not depend on the (truncated) distribution of just the cost types that actually bid. His mark-up is independent of the reserve price.
The reason is that the ROFR essentially transforms a simultaneous bidding competition into a sequential bidding competition. The non-favored bidder just needs to focus on the opponent's cost type and not his bid.
Using the non-favored bidder's equilibrium bidding function, I construct an expression for the expected cost when favoring either the strong or weak bidder. The fact, that the bidding function contains min(), max() functions makes it necessary to account for following cases: Depending on the value of θ i , there may be bidders that mark-up their bids to θ i . This is the case if θ i > 0.5.
If the auctioneer favors the weak bidder his expected cost when asymmetry is low (θ w ≤ 0.5) is given by
The expression consists of three components, which are represented by the three lines of the equation above: the first line represents the expected value to the buyer from buying the good, which is equal to the probability that at least one of the two buyers places a bid.
The second line comprises the part of the expected cost that occurs when the favored weak bidders does place an initial bid of r.In this case he may face a non-favored bidder, who may have exhibited three possible bidding behaviors: Bid according to θ+1 2 , bid the reserve price r or do not bid at all (and hence the favored, weak bidder wins with his initial bid of r). Note that depending on the value of the reserve price r, some or all cost types of a non-favored bidder bids the reserve price. If the reserve price is low such that 2r − 1 < 0 all cost types that submit bids bids the reserve price. If the reserve price is higher such that 2r − 1 > 0, bidders with very low cost types bid below the reserve.
Finally, the third line of E(Surplus, w) represents the part of the expected cost when the favored weak bidder does not even place an initial bid r. In this case the non-favored bidder either bids according to θ+1 2 or bids the reserve price r.
If asymmetry is high (θ i > 0.5), E(Surplus, w) still has three components as shown below: the expected value (first line), the expected cost when favored bidder participates (second line) and the expected cost when the favored bidder does not participate (third line). The only difference now is that the non-favored (strong) bidder may bid differently. If he has a low enough cost type, he can bid θ w and still be ensured to win with this bid. The expected payment to the auctioneer in thise case is
where the added (2θ w − 1)θ w terms reflect the part of the expected cost when the non-favored (strong) bidder is assured the contract by bidding θ w . Additionally, as discussed above, I have to consider the possibility that the auctioneer prefers to set a reserve price r = . With 2r − 1 < 0, all cost types of the non-favored (strong) bidder that do participate bids the reserve price. The intuition is as follows: The ROFR, as I have shown in section 3, is not useful in order to reduce expected cost when asymmetry is low. In fact the ROFR is costly when bidders are similar. Hence, the buyer may want to set the reserve price in a way that neutralizes the ROFR. Since all participating bidders, whether favored or not, bid the reserve price, the ROFR loses its relevance in terms of expected cost. As asymmetry increases, the weak bidders are distributed more densely over a shrinking support. Any increase in the reserve price therefore has a increasingly larger marginal effect. The auctioneer wants to trade off losses due to higher reserve prices against gains in the probability that the weak bidder participates in the bidding. Hence with asymmetry, the optimal reserve price will rise. . Once the degree of asymmetry reaches θ w = 1 4 , some of the non-favored (strong) bidders take advantage of their low cost type and bid below the reserve price. This is now possible, because for these cost types (θ < 2r −1) the reserve price no longer represents a binding constraint. Furthermore, for the auctioneer this means that an increase in the reserve price no longer uniformly applies to all cost types of the strong bidder as before. That is, the marginal loss due to higher reserve prices are lower than under low levels of asymmetry (θ w ≤ 1 4 ). Since the marginal gains to raising the reserve price still remain the same, the auctioneer adjusts the reserve price at a steeper rate than before.
(iii) For high levels of asymmetry, θ w ∈ [ 1 2 , 1] I have to additionally consider the possibility that the auctioneer sets such a low reserve price that the (weak) favored bidder declines to bid with certainty. The reasoning is the following: If the auctioneer faces a situation when a bidder declines to bid with certainty, then the auctioneer faces a monopolist situation and his expected surplus is given by r− r 0 r dθ. The optimal reserve price to set is r = 1 2 , which yields a surplus of 1 4 . Since only bidders with cost types larger than r refuses to bid, the only case in which an auctioneer can be sure that he is facing a single (strong) bidder is when θ w ≥ 1 2 . On the other hand, the expected surplus when both bidder may bid with nonzero probability derives to be
. Standard algebraic manipulation shows that as long as θ w ≤ 2 , 0.6389] the result and intuition for the optimal reserve prices remains unchanged from (ii). The only difference now is that the extent of asymmetry is so large that strong bidder with low cost types can exploit their cost advantage even more. The lowest cost bidders with θ < θ w can mark their bids up to θ w and matching the most efficient of the favored bidders. This change in bidding however, does not change the trade-offs that the auctioneer faces when setting the optimal reserve price. The marginal loss due to an increase in the reserve price remains unchanged, because the aforementioned change in bidding (bid θ w and a large mark-up instead of bid θ+1 2 and a small mark-up) only affects low cost types of the strong (non-favorite) bidder, for whom the reserve price is irrelevant anyway. The marginal gains to increasing the reserve also are the same, so the auctioneer keeps setting the optimal reserve according to r = 1+2θ w 3
. However, the auctioneer experiences an increased rate of deterioration of the expected surplus due to an increase in asymmetry.
(iii.b) For θ w ∈ [0.6389, 1] the auctioneer optimally sets r = 1 2 and thereby makes sure that the only bidder to bid is the strong bidder. In this one-onone situation the auctioneer has all the bargaining power and exploits this by making essentially a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer.
Substituting the expression of the optimal reserve price into the auctioneer's expected suplus, I get:
The expected surplus when favoring the weak bidder w is given by
The expected surplus decreases as the degree of asymmetry as measured by θ w increases. The expected surplus never falls below 1 4 since the auctioneer can always turn the auction into a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer. I now consider the case when the buyer decides to grant the strong bidder a ROFR. The buyer's expected surplus in that case is given by the expression
Similar to E(Surplus, w) consists of three components -expected value to auctioneer, expected cost when the favored bidder places a bid and expected cost when he declines to bid -which are represented by the three lines of the equation above.
The buyer sets the reserve price r such that he maximizes E(Surplus, s). Much like before, I distinguish two different settings for the choice of the optimal reserve: (i) If the degree of asymmetry is sufficiently low (θ w < 37 64 = 0.578), it is best for the buyer to set the reserve r = 1 − √ 3−3θ w 3
. The rationale is the same as in the case when the buyers favors the weak bidder: The granting of the ROFR does more harm than good, so the buyer sets a reserve price that makes the ROFR more or less irrelevant in expected cost terms (the ROFR still does matters in terms of which of the two bidders actually gets the contract). As before, an increase in asymmetry results in an increase in the reserve price.
(ii) If asymmetry if sufficiently high, θ w ≥ 37 64 , the buyer stops considering the weak bidder as a potential competitor in the bidding contest. Instead he sets the reserve price r = 1 2 , which is optimal if he were only facing the strong bidder. Note, there is a discontinuity in the optimal reserve price at θ w = 37 64 . This is explained by the fact that as the buyer stops considering the weak bidder and the buyer is now operating under a different objective function. Again, the intuition is to set such a low reserve price as to make the ROFR irrelevant. However, the auctioneer no longer benefits from soliciting bids from the weak bidder. Hence he reduces the auction to a single "take-it-or-leave-it" offer made to the strong bidder.
By substituting the appropriate optimal reserve prices into E(Surplus, s) I find:.
Proposition 10 If the strong bidder s is favored, the expected net surplus to the auctioneer is given by I therefore find that:
Proposition 11 When allowed to determine the reserve price, the auctioneer always weakly prefers to grant the weak bidder a ROFR For intermediate degrees of asymmetry, θ w ∈ [ When comparing the expected surplus from favoring the weak bidder under no reserve price and an endogenous reserve price, I observe the following: The expected surplus at all levels of asymmetry is higher when the auctioneer optimally sets the reserve. The auctioneer obtains an additional tool of influencing the auction and hence can only gain. Furthermore, except for high levels of asymmetry, the expected surplus decreases at a more rapid rate as asymmetry increases when the reserve price is endogenous.
Comparing ROFR with no favoritism
Considering both policies -no favoritism or granting a ROFR -previously described, the following graphs (the accompanying table is in the appendix) below presents the optimal values for the reserve price as well as the expected surplus at various values of θ w for either policy: Under both policies the optimal reserve price rises as θ w increases until sufficiently large. At that point the optimal reserve reverts to r = 1 2 as the auctioneer no longer tailor the reserve price to a two-bidder competition, but instead to a single bidder.
The intuition for the increase in the optimal reserve price as asymmetry increases is the same under both policies: Any increase in the reserve price raises the the probability that the weak bidder places a bid. On the other hand, a higher reserve price also raises the expected cost to the auctioneer from higher bids by the (strong) bidder. As asymmetry increases the gain in probability from a higher reserve becomes more pronounced. Overall, the auctioneer therefore wants to increase his reserve price.
For low levels of asymmetry the optimal reserve price is higher when favoring no one, but nevertheless results in a higher expected surplus. This is explained by the fact that a reduction in the reserve price is less effective in reducing cost when no ROFR is present. While in an auction with a favored bidder a lesser reserve price translates into a one-to-one reduction in the bid placed for most types, since they bid the reserve if at all, this is not the case when no ROFR is granted. When no ROFR is offered, only the most efficient cost type to bid cuts his bid accordingly, while all other types reflect the decreased reserve only partially through a lower mark-up. However, an increase in asymmetry affects the optimal reserve price generally less than in the auction with ROFR.
When I compare the expected surplus under the two alternative regimes, granting a ROFR to one of the bidders and no ROFR at all, I find that Proposition 12 When the auctioneer can optimally set the reserve price, granting a ROFR to the weak bidder is weakly beneficial to the auctioneer for degrees of asymmetry θ w ≥ 0.505. The auctioneer strictly gains from granting a ROFR when 0.6389 ≥ θ w ≥ 0.505.
Numerical results show that for θ w ≥ 0.505 when granting a ROFR to the weak bidder the expected surplus is higher than when no bidder is favored. However, as the table indicates the auctioneer obtains a strictly larger surplus only for a relatively small range of values of θ w . Numerical computations indicate that for θ w > 0.6389 the expected surplus under either policy is in fact the same, because in either case the auctioneer sets an optimal reserve price r = 1 2 and shuts out the weak bidder. Hence the auctioneer strictly gains from granting a ROFR only when 0.505 ≤ θ w ≤ 0.6389.
Naturally the question arises, why the range of values in which a ROFR truly is a benefit is relatively small and why this range of values is intermediate.
Some of the intuition follows the same arguments when required to grant a ROFR. The presence of an endogenous reserve price makes a ROFR noneffective for low and high degrees of asymmetry. For high degrees, the reserve price renders the ROFR completely irrelevant by turning the auction into a bilateral bargaining situation between the auctioneer and the strong bidder. The reserve price completely displaces the ROFR as the effective tool, as the reserve price proves to be the more powerful tool. For low degrees, the reserve price is set low enough so that any bidder that is still willing to place a bid bids the reserve price. Hence in terms of the bid distribution the ROFR becomes irrelevant. However, with regard to expected surplus the auctioneer does better when not offering a ROFR. This is because in the presence of a ROFR the reserve price has a dual purpose: To improve surplus, but also to counterbalance the ROFR, which proves to be harmful at low levels of asymmetry. The need to counterbalance the ROFR forces the auctioneer to set the optimal reserve too low.
Only for the small range of intermediate degrees of asymmetry, there no longer is a need to offset the ROFR. Actually the ROFR now actually helps to counter the asymmetry between the two bidders. The choice of the optimal reserve price now is primarily driven by eliciting more aggressive bids. When no ROFR is present the surplus-enhancing effect of the reserve price is lowered by the asymmetry between the bidders.
In summary, the intuition from the no reserve price case, that for low degrees of asymmetry the ROFR tilts the balance between the two bidders too much in favor of one side, still holds. However, with an endogenous reserve price, as seen in the preceding discussion, the reserve price can be used to neutralize the effect of a ROFR. This proves useful both when the ROFR is too powerful (as for low degrees of asymmetry) and when the ROFR is too weak (for high degrees of asymmetry).
Effective Degree of Asymmetry
I have argued that the reserve price has two functions in an auction with a ROFR: To elicit generally more agressive bids and to counterbalance or neutralize the ROFR. In constrast, if the auctioneer favors neither bidder, the reserve price's purpose is limited to the former. The difference in the reserve price, when favoring a bidder versus or no favoritism, therefore reflects the attempt to offset the ROFR. I will demonstrate that this counterbalancing of the ROFR is best understood as a change in the degree of asymmetry that the bidders face.
I start by defining the effective level of asymmetry:
Definition 13 The effective asymmetry α is defined as α = 1 − r−θ w r and measures the degree of asymmetry on the support of cost types for bidders that actually place bids.
The effective asymmetry α can take on values between 0, lowest level of effective asymmetry, and 1, highest level of asymmetry. α = 1 when the reserve price r it equals θ w , or when no cost type of the weak bidder will actually place a bid.
For the no reserve price case, r = 1 and hence α = θ w . For different levels of θ w , the effective degree of asymmetry are If I interpret the difference in effective asymmetry as a way to offset the effect of the ROFR, then the findings nicely fit with the intuition offered previously: For low degrees of asymmetry θ w the ROFR is harmful in that it tilts the playing field too heavily towards the weak bidder. Increasing effective asymmetry counters this tilt by increasing the relative cost advantage of the strong bidder. Once asymmetry surpasses θ w = 0.4 assigning a ROFR provides the desired "levelling of the playing field". Decreasing effective asymmetry by choosing a slightly lower reserve price now serves to level the playing field even further.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper I have shown conditions under which an auctioneer deliberately wants to favor a bidder. I have demonstrated that favoring a weak bidder by offering him a ROFR benefits the auctioneer if the asymmetry between the two bidders is sufficiently large. With no reserve price assigning a ROFR strictly improves the expected surplus for sufficiently large asymmetry. When the auctioneer can set the reserve price optimally, assigning a ROFR weakly improves the expected surplus for sufficiently large degrees of asymmetry, with strict gains for intermediate levels of asymmetry.
With both no reserve price and endogenous reserve price, the rationale for increasing the expected surplus is the same: Granting a ROFR eliminates the advantageous position of the strong bidder while allowing the weak bidder to bid less aggressively. If the asymmetry is sufficiently large, the gains from eliminating the strong bidder's advantage more than outweighs the losses to the weak bidder. When the auctioneer is also allowed to set the reserve price, the reserve price reduces the effectiveness of the ROFR. In some cases the reserve in fact displaces the ROFR as the main surplus-enhancing tool. The complementarity between the reserve price and the ROFR is due to the fact that the reserve price exacerbates the degree of effective asymmetry faced by the bidders.
My results confirm the finding of the literature on optimal auctions that the auctioneer does best when subsidizing the bidder who is more likely to be disadvantaged. The ROFR serves this purpose for sufficiently large degrees of asymmetry. For lower degrees of asymmetry the ROFR proves to be too simple and crude a tool because it excessively handicaps the strong bidder.
Nevertheless, the simplicity of the ROFR as a mechanism make it an attractive tool for the auctioneer in order to increase his expected surplus.
Hence, if I integrate both sides, I obtain
In order to obtain the value of the constant, I use the fact that θ w (1) = θ s (1) = 1, that is the highest possible bid 1 will be placed by the most inefficient type 1 of either bidder. In this case the constant is 1.
2 , I rewrite the first-order conditions such that In order to obtain the value of the constant k i , I first need to obtain the value of the lowest possible bid b. We know that this bid will be placed by the most efficient types θ w and θ s = 0.Hence I know that θ w (b) = θ w and θ s (b) = 0. Therefore (1−θ w ) 2 . One can analogously derive k w .
Derivations for corrollary 2:
The expected cost generally is written as E(Cost, no) = Evaluating the integral expression using Mathematica yields the above expression. The initial steps of derivation for the inverse equilibrium bidding functions are identical with the derivations for proposition 4 up to the point of determining the constant of the expression The initial values needed to compute the constant are different for the endogenous reserve price case. The highest possible bid that either weak or strong bidder will place is r and the associated cost type that will do so is θ w , θ s = r. Hence I know the initial values are θ w (r) = r and θ s (r) = r.
Hence (θ w (r) − r)(θ s (r) − r) = r 2 − 2r + const. or const. = −(r 2 − 2r). In order to obtain the value of the constant k i , I first need to obtain the value of the lowest possible bid b. We know that this bid will be placed by the most efficient types θ w and θ s = 0.Hence I know that θ w (b) = θ w and θ s (b) = 0. Therefore One can analogously derive k w . 
